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ABSTRACT 
This paper examines whether Japanese regional banks entering the banking market in other 
prefectures, including neighboring prefectures, can increase their lending-based income. To stimulate 
local economies and support local small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), the current 
Japanese government’s policies for regional banks require these banks to engage in region-based 
relationship banking practices. In this study, three lending-based income measures were used as 
dependent variables, and estimation was made using panel data from Japanese regional banks. As a 
result, it was determined that regional banks that enter markets in other prefectures experience 
positive effects in all three lending-based income measures. Moreover, it was determined that 
regional banks whose headquarters are located in non-urban areas derive greater benefit from their 
loan businesses upon entry into other prefectures, including neighboring prefectures, where 
economic activity is more vibrant than regional banks whose headquarters are located in urban areas. 
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1. Introduction 
Japanese financial institutions are largely classified into city banks, which operate throughout the 
country and internationally, and regional financial institutions, which operate in particular regions 
and have deep connections to those areas. The latter are composed of first- and second-tier regional 
banks, which are both publicly listed and unlisted corporations, and cooperative financial institutions 
such as credit associations and credit cooperatives, which operate as non-profit organizations and are 
established mainly to offer financial services to members and associates living in particular areas or 
employed in certain occupations. 
Since 2003, the Japanese government has required regional financial institutions, including both 
regional banks and cooperative financial institutions, to practice region-based relationship banking. 
Relationship banking is a business model based on lending formulas, which considers not only the 
hard financial data in the statements of borrower firms but also soft information, which accumulates 
through a long-term business relationship between the financial institutions and the borrower. The 
Japanese government probably believes this model to be appropriate for regional financial 
institutions since these institutions have a history of operating in relatively limited geographical 
areas; thus, they are in a better position to establish close relationships with regional small- and 
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). As specified in the “New Action Program concerning 
enhancement of Relationship Banking Functions”1, the government expects regional financial 
institutions to take the lead over the larger banks in stimulating regional economies by servicing 
local SMEs. In Japan, because differences in the economic conditions among regions have recently 
increased, regional financial institutions are now expected to support regional firms and industries 
and improve this situation, mainly through financing local SMEs2. 
However, among regional financial institutions, many regional banks expand their branch networks 
and provide financial services and loans in prefectures where their headquarters are not located3. The 
regional banks are stock corporations; thus, they actively seek profits through the expansion of their 
branch networks. However, if these regional banks focus only on profitability, expectations 
regarding their promotion of local economies might not be met4. 
                                                  
1 It is called the “New Action Program” in brief and was devised by Financial Services Agency 
(FSA) in 2005. 
2 Burgess and Pande (2005) analyzed whether branch expansion into rural unbanked areas reduces 
rural poverty in India and determined that opening branches in rural unbanked areas is associated 
with poverty reduction. Thus, financial functions performed by banks in poorer regional markets are 
important for improving the local economic situation. 
3 Felici and Pagnini (2008) investigated the determinants of entry into other markets by Italian 
banks and demonstrated that, due to the advancing information and communication technology, 
banks are able to open branches in distant markets. Similarly, Japanese regional banks can also enter 
other regions more easily. 
4 Alamá and Tortosa-Ausina (2012) analyzed bank branching patterns during the post-deregulation 
period and showed that some communities experienced financial exclusion. Thus, the same could 
occur in Japanese regional markets if many regional banks over-extend their branch networks into 
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Most previous studies that investigated the determinants of bank branch expansions revealed that 
banks are more likely to enter regional markets with higher income levels (Keeton 2000; Seelig and 
Critchfield 2003; Berger et al. 2004; Feinberg 2008; Feinberg 2009). Thus, the primary motivation 
for this observed inter-regional expansion of regional banks is to seek profits unavailable in the 
regions where they are headquartered. These profits are derived from larger, high-performing firms, 
where lending opportunities are greater and the risks are lower. However, it is unclear whether the 
banks following this strategy actually increase their lending-based income. 
Models that test structure–conduct–performance (SCP) and efficient structure (ES) hypotheses are 
often used to analyze the determinants of bank performance (Clarke et al. 1984; Smirlock 1985; 
Evanoff and Fortier 1988; Lloyd-Williams and Molyneux 1994; Berger 1995; Molyneux and Forbes 
1995; Tu and Chen 2000; Naceur and Goaied 2001; Shaffer and Srinivasan 2002; Pilloff and 
Rhoades 2002; Goddard et al. 2008; Hahn 2008; Al-Muharrami and Matthews 2009; Garza-Garcia 
2012)5. The present study empirically investigates whether entering other prefectures (regions where 
a bank’s headquarters are not located) has a positive effect on their lending-based income using a 
specific framework designed to test the SCP and ES hypotheses. We attempt to clarify the 
motivations of regional banks to expand their branch networks into other prefectures, despite 
government requirements for region-based relationship banking practices. We also consider whether 
these behaviors are actually economically appropriate for their businesses. 
This paper is organized as follows: in Section 2, previous studies that have analyzed the effects of 
bank branch expansion on bank performance are reviewed; Section 3 discusses the analytical method 
and data sources; in Section 4, the empirical results are interpreted and summarized, with 
conclusions provided in the final section. 
 
 
2. Literature Review 
We will first review previous studies that tested the effects of bank branch expansion and 
management area extension on bank performance6. 
Chong (1991) analyzed the effects of US interstate banking on bank profitability and risk exposure 
using an event study methodology. He concluded that interstate banking benefits small and medium 
banks in terms of increased profitability; however, this increase is associated with significantly 
increased exposure to market risk for medium and large banks. Rivard and Thomas (1997) 
investigated performance differences between large bank holding companies operating subsidiaries 
in other regions and bank holding companies operating in a single region. They determined that the 
                                                                                                                                                  
other prefectures. 
5 The studies that only tested the SCP hypothesis are also included. 
6 Rasiah (2010) surveyed previous studies that tested the determinants of bank profitability and 
presented a few studies that used variables on bank branches as independent variables. 
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former experiences higher profitability, and both volatility risk and insolvency risk are less for the 
former. Seale (2004) considered the relationship between the number of bank branches and the 
averages of several financial ratios, and reported that extensive branch networks are associated with 
higher non-interest income, lower interest and non-interest expenses, and higher ROE, especially 
among community banks. Zou et al. (2011) examined the effects of deregulation of bank branching 
activity on bank performance across regions, and demonstrated that profits and the 
net-interest-margin ratios of banks with more branches are higher. 
Although the abovementioned studies demonstrated that branch expansions positively influence 
bank performance, Hirtle (2007) tested whether the branch network size has positive effects on bank 
profitability and found no systematic correlation. In addition, he investigated the relationship 
between branch network size and branch performance, showing that banks with mid-sized branch 
networks may be at a competitive disadvantage compared with banks that have small- and 
large-sized branch networks. Hirtle and Stiroh (2007) estimated the equation that tests the effect of 
branch numbers per assets on bank profitability and determined that the former negatively influences 
the latter. Therefore, we cannot exactly assert that banks with larger numbers of branches in their 
network can expect improved performance. The present study clarifies whether having a larger 
number of network branches improves the lending performance of Japanese regional banks operating 
in other prefectures. 
Previous studies have tested the effects of the deregulation of bank branching on bank performance7. 
Nippani and Green (2003) analyzed the impact of the Riegle–Neal Interstate Banking and Branching 
Efficiency Act (IBBEA) on performance in the US banking industry by comparing the banks’ 
performances in pre- and post-IBBEA periods. They demonstrated that performance improved in the 
post-IBBEA period; however, when controlled for real GDP and prime rate, no significant effects of 
IBBEA were observed. Zou et al. (2011) demonstrated that the effects of this deregulation of 
interstate bank branching on bank performance differ according to bank size. 
 
 
3. Methodology and Data 
3.1 Methodology 
The following model is estimated using panel data obtained for Japanese regional banks from 2005 
to 2010. 
 
itititit
ititititit
PerincomecPopulationcOutbranchcNonperformc
CapitalcAssetceMarketsharcionConcentratccomeLendinginc
9876
54321
++++
++++=
 
 
                                                  
7 In Japan, restrictions on bank branching were completely abolished in 1997. 
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Here, subscript i refers to bank i and subscript t refers to year t. As mentioned in Section 1, the 
strongest motivation for regional banks is to exploit more lending opportunities with 
higher-performing firms; as a result, they pursue more lending-based income by entering other 
prefectures. Thus, we use measures of loan-related income streams as the dependent variable 
Lendingincome. Specifically, these measures comprise the following: (1) dividing the interest on 
loans and discounts for each bank by the total assets of each bank to mitigate the bank size 
differences, which is represented by “Lendingincome1,” (2) dividing (interest on loans and discounts 
− interest on deposits) for each bank by the total assets of each bank to mitigate the bank size 
differences, which is represented by “Lendingincome2,” and (3) the natural logarithm of (interest on 
loans and discounts − interest on deposits) for each bank, which is represented by 
“Lendingincome3.” 
Concentration is a proxy for the competitive environment among financial institutions in regional 
markets. Both HHI and Top3share are used as Concentration. HHI is the Herfindahl–Hirschman 
Index, which is calculated based on the deposits of regional banks and credit associations whose 
headquarters are located in the same prefecture as the headquarters of bank i. Top3share is the 
proportion of the sum of deposits at the top three financial institutions whose headquarters are 
located in the same prefecture as the headquarters of bank i to the sum of deposits at regional banks 
and credit associations whose headquarters are located in that prefecture8. 
Marketshare (%) represents the share of deposits at bank i compared with the sum of deposits at 
regional banks and credit associations whose headquarters are located in the same prefecture as the 
headquarters of bank i. If the coefficient of Concentration takes a significantly positive sign, the SCP 
hypothesis is supported within the context of the Japanese regional lending market. On the other 
hand, if the coefficient of Marketshare takes a significantly positive sign, the ES hypothesis is 
supported in these markets. 
Asset is the asset for each bank, and is a proxy for bank size. If larger banks have stronger 
negotiating power with other firms, they might also have greater capability to negotiate with 
higher-performing firms. If larger banks actually have such an advantage and if this advantage 
increases their lending-based income, then the coefficient of Asset will be positive. Asset is 
converted into a natural logarithm. 
Capital (%) represents the capital–asset ratio for each bank, and is a proxy for bank soundness. 
Because regional banks in sound financial positions have more reserves, they may be willing to 
accept greater risks when lending to firms whose credit risks are higher. In this case, the coefficient 
of Capital will be positive. On the other hand, regional banks whose capital–asset ratios are high 
might tend to be risk averse; i.e., they prefer to consolidate the benefits of their sound financial 
                                                  
8 Berger and Hannan (1989), Tokle and Tokle (2000), and Wu and Shen (2011) used a three-firm 
concentration ratio as the market concentration measure. 
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position, e.g., in good market conditions, they prefer to obtain money from capital markets and 
depositors. Thus, it is possible that these banks place a relatively high emphasis on low-risk 
businesses such as investing in government bonds and selling investment trusts than on lending to 
higher-risk SMEs. As a result, these banks might not be able to increase their lending-based income, 
and the coefficient of Capital will be negative. 
However, there are regional banks that are required to meet the BIS (Bank for International 
Settlement) standard for capital–asset ratio, while others are required to meet Japan’s domestic 
standards9. It is impossible to directly compare these capital–asset ratios, as they are calculated 
differently. Thus, we calculate the capital–asset ratio by dividing capital base by assets. 
Nonperform (%) represents each bank’s non-performing loan ratio, which is calculated by dividing 
risk-managed loans by loans and bills discounted. Because banks whose Nonperform is high have 
more loan receivables that are difficult to collect, these banks might not be able to collect enough 
interest on loans and bills discounted from these types of loan receivables. If this effect on 
lending-based income is positive, the coefficient of Nonperform will be negative. On the other hand, 
banks holding more non-performing loans are less risk averse. Thus, the possibility exists that these 
banks can receive significant risk premiums from their high-risk loan receivables; i.e., high risk 
yields high return. If this effect on lending-based income is positive, the coefficient of Nonperform 
will be positive. 
Outbranch (%) is the ratio of the number of branches located outside the prefecture where the 
headquarters of bank i is located to the total number of branches of bank i. If regional banks that 
actively enter other prefectures succeed in increasing their lending-based income, the coefficient of 
Outbranch will take a significantly positive sign. This is an important test in the present paper. 
Population is the population size in the prefecture where the headquarters of bank i is located, and is 
a proxy for market size. It can be considered that customers’ needs for retail loans such as housing 
loans are larger in regional markets that have larger populations. If this effect on lending-based 
income of regional banks is positive, the coefficient of Population will be positive. Population is 
converted into a natural logarithm. 
Perincome is the average per capita prefectural income in the prefecture where the headquarters of 
bank i is located, and is a proxy for the economic vitality and wealth of each prefecture. Because 
high-performing firms are more active in prefectures where income levels are higher, the funding 
requirements of firms in these markets are also larger. If this factor contributes to an increase in 
lending-based income, the coefficient of Perincome will be positive. 
 
3.2 Data 
Data from the financial statements of individual banks and credit associations were obtained from 
                                                  
9 The domestic standard is applied to financial institutions that operate only in Japan. 
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Nikkei Needs. Data absent from Nikkei Needs were supplemented by “Analysis of Financial 
Statements of All Banks,” edited by the Japanese Bankers Association and “Financial Statements of 
All Credit Associations,” edited by the Consultant of Financial Books Co., Ltd. Data on bank branch 
numbers that are in the prefectures where the headquarters of each regional bank is located were 
obtained from the “Financial Map,” edited by the Japan Financial News Co., Ltd., and the total 
number of branches of each regional bank were obtained from the “Analysis of Financial Statements 
of All Banks.” Prefectural data are quoted from “Financial Resources of a Nation,” edited by Asahi 
Shimbun. 
The descriptive statistics used in this study are presented in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
4. Estimation Results 
4.1 Estimation Results for All Regional Banks 
In this section, we discuss the results of the estimation model mentioned in Section 3.1 using panel 
data from all regional banks. The estimation results are presented in Table 2. 
 
Table 2. Estimation Results for All Regional Banks 
 
First, both the coefficients of HHI and Top3share take significantly positive signs at the 5% level in 
the estimation results whose dependent variable is Lendingincome1, i.e., the ones dividing interest 
on loans and discounts for each bank by the total assets of each bank. Thus, regional banks whose 
headquarters are located in prefectures where competition among financial institutions is not severe 
generate higher interest on loans and discounts. Hence, there is a possibility that regional banks, 
whose headquarters are located in prefectures where oligopolistic tendencies are stronger, can set 
higher lending interest rates and increase their income from loans and discounts. 
The coefficients of Asset take significantly negative signs at the 1% level in both results; thus, larger 
regional banks cannot gain interest on loans and discounts relative to their sizes, i.e., the per unit 
interest on loans and discounts is not necessarily larger, although these banks might have relatively 
strong negotiating power with other firms. On the other hand, smaller regional banks pursue loan 
sales more aggressively to supplement their management weaknesses compared with larger regional 
banks. Therefore, they can increase the interest on loans and discounts relative to their sizes, i.e., the 
per unit interest on loans and discounts is larger. 
The coefficients of Capital are negative and significant at the 1% level for both results. Regional 
banks that are financially sound are also likely to be risk averse in lending. Therefore, they are more 
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likely to concentrate on low-risk behaviors rather than on loan sales to maintain their financial 
stability. Thus, these banks cannot seek premium interest on loans and discounts. In addition, when 
we consider that the coefficients of Nonperform are positive and significant at the 5% and 10% 
levels in both results, it seems that regional banks that engage in riskier lending behaviors and hold a 
relatively high number of non-performing loans increase their lending-based income by charging 
additional risk premiums. Considering the signs of the coefficients of Capital and Nonperform, 
regional banks engaged in high-risk lending behaviors can receive higher returns from their loan 
businesses; thus, the idea of “high-risk, high-return” is supported in the Japanese regional banking 
sector. 
The coefficients of Perincome take significantly positive signs at the 1% level in both cases. 
Businesses are more active and the funding requirements of firms are larger in prefectures whose 
income levels are higher. Thus, regional banks that have headquarters in those prefectures can 
increase the interest charged on loans and discounts. Hence, the interest charged on loans and 
discounts by regional banks is strongly affected by the economic performance of the prefecture 
where their headquarters are located, which is consistent with expectations. 
The coefficients of Outbranch, which is the variable of most interest to this study, take significantly 
positive signs at the 1% level in both cases. Previous studies, presented in Section 1, concluded that 
banks actively enter regions whose income levels are high. Therefore, regional banks that expand 
into other prefectures, particularly those with higher income levels, can increase their earnings from 
interest on loans and discounts, as they exploit new lending opportunities to high-performing firms 
in those markets. 
Second, we examine the estimation results whose dependent variable is Lendingincome2 (i.e., the 
ones dividing [interest on loans and discounts − interest on deposits] for each bank by the total assets 
of each bank), and those whose dependent variable is Lendingincome3 (i.e., the natural logarithm of 
[interest on loans and discounts − interest on deposits] of each bank), to determine the effects of 
regional bank entries into other prefectures on lending-based income, from the aspect of 
interest-based profit margins. 
Moreover, all the coefficients of HHI and Top3share take significantly positive signs at the 10% 
level in these estimations. Thus, regional banks whose headquarters are located in prefectures where 
oligopolistic tendencies are stronger can increase their loan business profitability. 
The coefficients of Asset in the results of Lendingincome3 are positive and significant at the 1% 
level. When we consider the amount of money itself, larger regional banks gain larger profits, which 
is an expected result.  
On the other hand, the coefficients of Asset in the results of Lendingincome2 take significantly 
negative signs at the 1% level, as do the coefficients of Asset in the results of Lendingincome1. Thus, 
larger regional banks cannot necessarily achieve higher returns corresponding to their sizes, i.e., per 
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unit returns, even when measured by interest-based profit margins. The same result is obtained in the 
cases of interest on loans and discounts. In other words, smaller regional banks can actively exploit 
these new lending opportunities and generate higher per unit returns (i.e., relative to their size).  
The coefficients of Capital are positive and significant at the 1% level in all estimations, which is 
different from the cases of Lendingincome1. In general, regional banks that are financially sound 
(i.e., present a lower investment risk) can still attract depositors while offering lower deposit interest 
rates. In addition, because sound regional banks can procure money from capital markets under good 
terms, which these banks can use aggressively as funding sources. The positive effects of Capital on 
profit margins from interest might reflect these behaviors. 
The coefficients of Population and Perincome take significantly positive signs at the 1% level in all 
cases. Thus, regional banks that have headquarters in prefectures where market sizes are larger and 
economic activities are more vibrant, i.e., markets where funding requirements by high-performing 
firms and households are larger, can expect to gain larger interest-based profit margins. 
The coefficients of Outbranch take significantly positive signs at the 1% level in all estimations, as 
in those of Lendingincome1. Therefore, the entry of regional banks into other prefectures has 
positive effects on their lending-based income not only from interest on loans and discounts but also 
in terms of interest-based profit margins. These results lead to the conclusion that regional banks can 
expect to achieve their aims to increase lending-based revenue streams by entering the markets of 
other prefectures. 
 
4.2 Estimation Results for Non-Urban Regional Banks 
Regional banks whose headquarters are located in non-urban areas can possibly realize greater 
economic returns by entering other prefectures than those realized by regional banks whose 
headquarters are located in cities. The former might be able to generate more lending-based income 
by entering prefectures where economic activity and wealth is greater. In the following section, we 
analyze whether non-urban regional banks can actually achieve positive effects by entering the 
markets of other prefectures. 
For this analysis, the regional banks whose headquarters are located in Hokkaido, Miyagi Prefecture, 
Tokyo Metropolis, Aichi Prefecture, Osaka Prefecture, and Fukuoka Prefecture are excluded from 
the sample and estimates, because the seat of the prefectural government in these prefectures are 
Japanese main cities10. The estimation results are presented in Table 3. 
 
Table 3. Estimation Results for Non-Urban Regional Banks 
 
                                                  
10 These are, respectively, Sapporo City, Sendai City, Shinjuku Ward, Nagoya City, Osaka City, and 
Hakata City. 
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First, with the exception of Outbranch, the coefficients for the variables are nearly the same as those 
presented in Table 2, although with some exceptions. 
The coefficients of Outbranch in all estimations, i.e., the cases whose dependent variables are 
Lendingincome1, Lendingincome2, and Lendingincome3, take significantly positive signs at the 1% 
level. Among these, regional banks whose headquarters are located in prefectures whose seats of the 
prefectural government are not main cities can expect to generate higher lending-based income by 
entering other prefectures, especially those with vibrant economic activity. Furthermore, the 
magnitudes of the coefficients of Outbranch in all estimations are larger than those in Table 2, where 
the sample included all regional banks. In general, regional banks that have headquarters in 
economically vibrant urban areas can expect higher lending-based income by placing more emphasis 
on loan businesses in their home prefectures than those in other prefectures. Moreover, these banks 
should expect smaller increase in leading-based income from non-urban areas. On the other hand, 
the lending-based income for regional banks whose headquarters are not in urban areas, which is the 
sample used in this analysis, will be improved by entering other prefectures, including neighboring 
urban areas, and selling loans there rather than selling loans only in their home prefectures. Hence, 
the differences between the magnitudes of the coefficients of Outbranch in Table 2 and those in 
Table 3 reflect the different situations of non-urban regional banks compared with urban regional 
banks. 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
Although Japanese regional financial institutions are required to practice region-based relationship 
banking, many regional banks enter prefectures where their headquarters are not located. This 
requirement stems from the government’s recognizing that regional banks are suitable for 
stimulating regional economies and facilitating SME funding. Therefore, this study investigates 
whether the entry of regional banks into other prefectures generates positive financial effects. 
Because the main purpose of regional banks to enter other prefectures is to expand their lending base, 
the effects of the ratio of branches in other prefectures of regional banks on their lending-based 
income are analyzed. Specifically, three lending-based income measures were used as dependent 
variables and an estimation was performed. All the estimations revealed that regional banks that 
positively enter other prefectures can increase their lending-based income. In addition, the proxy 
variables for regional characteristics such as per capita prefectural income also influence 
lending-based income. Therefore, market circumstances of prefectures where headquarters of each 
regional bank are located are important factors in determining their lending-based income. 
To establish whether there is a difference in the effects of entering other prefectures on 
lending-based income between regional banks that have headquarters in prefectures whose seats of 
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prefectural government are main cities and regional banks that have headquarters around those 
prefectures, an estimation using a sample of the latter regional banks was also performed. As a result, 
it was demonstrated that compared with the former regional banks, the latter can realize higher 
effects on lending-based income by entering other prefectures. The former regional banks gain more 
lending-based income by placing a greater emphasis on loan businesses in their home prefectures 
than in other prefectures. In contrast, the latter regional banks can increase their lending-based 
income by entering other prefectures, including neighboring urban areas, and actively selling loans 
there than by selling loans only in their home prefectures. 
Thus, the results obtained demonstrate that the entry of regional banks into other prefectures 
influences their lending-based income positively. Hence, regional banks whose headquarters are 
located in prefectures where economic activity is less cannot generate sufficient lending-based 
income in their home prefectures; thus, they have an incentive to enter other prefectures where 
economic activity is more vibrant and additional lending opportunities are present. However, when 
we consider that regional banks are key to region-based relationship banking, it is possible that 
over-extension by these banks into other prefectures might bring undesirable effects on the 
developments of regional firms and industries. Therefore, regional banks should adopt branch 
expansion strategies such that a balance exists between their roles as regional financial institutions 
and their commercial imperative to seek additional lending-based revenue. 
For future study, retardation of regional economies and decreased funding of SMEs because of 
entries of regional banks into other prefectures should be investigated. Moreover, when doing this 
analysis, those regional banks that have headquarters in non-urban areas should be studied, because 
they will possibly have greater incentive to enter other prefectures. 
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
 
Lending 
Income1 
Lending 
Income2 
Lending 
Income3 HHI Top3share 
Mean 1.506 1.337 31522.97 3648.180 81.354 
Median 1.459 1.297 25702.00 3658.997 87.215 
Maximum 2.679 2.349 168562.00 7175.260 100.000 
Minimum 0.482 0.417 3114.00 569.687 26.867 
Std. Dev. 0.337 0.319 24944.04 1517.209 17.592 
Observations 656 656 656 656 656 
 
Marketshare Asset Capital Nonperform Outbranch Population 
32.641 2610351 4.695 4.665 17.228 3138775 
23.951 2092965 4.755 4.194 14.049 1948250 
84.215 11693332 8.840 15.623 58.696 12609912 
2.070 183391 −14.238 1.288 0.000 595331 
23.591 2169944 1.750 2.035 13.220 2889797 
656 656 656 656 656 656 
 
Perincome 
2749.913 
2701.000 
4820.000 
1987.000 
481.166 
656 
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Table 2. Estimation Results for All Regional Banks 
   Lendingincome1  Lendingincome2  Lendingincome3 
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
  
(t-value) (t-value) (t-value) (t-value) (t-value) (t-value) 
Constant 
7.676 
(1.083) 
4.896 
(0.664) 
−17.734***
(−2.665) 
−20.009***
(−2.895) 
−19.697*** 
(−4.094) 
−21.546***
(−4.312) 
 HHI 
0.000** 
(2.396) 
 
 
0.000* 
(1.797) 
 
 
0.000* 
(1.952) 
 
 
 Top3share 
 
 
0.006** 
(2.041) 
 
 
0.005* 
(1.696) 
 
 
0.004* 
(1.887) 
 
Marketshare 
−0.001 
(−0.564) 
−0.001 
(−0.268) 
0.003 
(1.310) 
0.004 
(1.544) 
0.002 
(1.172) 
0.002 
(1.426) 
Asset 
−0.762*** 
(−12.903) 
−0.766***
(−12.913)
−0.870***
(−15.690)
−0.873***
(−15.707)
0.132*** 
(3.289) 
0.129*** 
(3.217) 
 Capital 
−0.019*** 
(−4.482) 
−0.019***
(−4.495) 
0.012*** 
(3.076) 
0.012*** 
(3.072) 
0.008*** 
(2.593) 
0.008*** 
(2.593) 
 
Nonperform 
0.007** 
(2.090) 
0.006* 
(1.941) 
0.037*** 
(12.550) 
0.036*** 
(12.499) 
0.023*** 
(10.736) 
0.023*** 
(10.671) 
 Outbranch 
0.017*** 
(5.339) 
0.017*** 
(5.133) 
0.010*** 
(3.285) 
0.010*** 
(3.117) 
0.010*** 
(4.438) 
0.009*** 
(4.240) 
 Population 
0.269 
(0.554) 
0.449 
(0.894) 
2.081*** 
(4.566) 
2.227*** 
(4.733) 
1.848*** 
(5.607) 
1.967*** 
(5.781) 
 Perincome 
0.000*** 
(4.569) 
0.000*** 
(4.390) 
0.000*** 
(5.701) 
0.000*** 
(5.588) 
0.000*** 
(5.159) 
0.000*** 
(5.032) 
Observations 656 656 656 656 656 656 
χ2 statistics 76.733*** 65.798*** 123.562*** 118.149*** 238.243*** 233.997***
Selected 
Model 
Fixed 
Effect 
Model 
Fixed 
Effect 
Model 
Fixed 
Effect 
Model 
Fixed 
Effect 
Model 
Fixed 
Effect 
Model 
Fixed 
Effect 
Model 
Adjusted-R2 0.929 0.929 0.930 0.930 0.994 0.994 
*Significance at the 10% level; **Significance at the 5% level; ***Significance at the 1% level. 
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Table 3. Estimation Results for Non-Urban Regional Banks 
   Lendingincome1  Lendingincome2  Lendingincome3 
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
  
(t-value) (t-value) (t-value) (t-value) (t-value) (t-value) 
Constant 
5.183 
(0.672) 
2.054 
(0.257) 
−41.801***
(−5.811) 
−44.684***
(−6.027) 
−37.356*** 
(−7.235) 
−39.674***
(−7.459) 
 HHI 
0.000** 
(2.260) 
 
 
0.000 
(1.039) 
 
 
0.000 
(1.203) 
 
 
 Top3share 
 
 
0.006* 
(1.864) 
 
 
0.005* 
(1.685) 
 
 
0.004* 
(1.893) 
 
Marketshare 
−0.003 
(−1.090) 
−0.002 
(−0.816) 
0.002 
(1.003) 
0.003 
(1.164) 
0.001 
(0.742) 
0.002 
(0.924) 
Asset 
−0.849*** 
(−13.935) 
−0.851***
(−13.926)
−0.878***
(−15.439)
−0.881***
(−15.517)
0.088** 
(2.152) 
0.085** 
(2.084) 
 Capital 
−0.019*** 
(−4.348) 
−0.019***
(−4.398) 
0.007* 
(1.779) 
0.007* 
(1.826) 
0.004 
(1.300) 
0.004 
(1.348) 
 
Nonperform 
0.005* 
(1.666) 
0.005 
(1.510) 
0.034*** 
(11.103) 
0.034*** 
(11.157) 
0.020*** 
(9.024) 
0.020*** 
(9.059) 
 Outbranch 
0.022*** 
(6.559) 
0.022*** 
(6.323) 
0.014*** 
(4.518) 
0.013*** 
(4.247) 
0.013*** 
(5.682) 
0.012*** 
(5.376) 
 Population 
0.537 
(0.998) 
0.745 
(1.346) 
3.832*** 
(7.620) 
4.017*** 
(7.800) 
3.177*** 
(8.804) 
3.326*** 
(9.003) 
 Perincome 
0.000** 
(2.452) 
0.000** 
(2.208) 
0.000 
(0.305) 
0.000 
(0.206) 
0.000 
(−0.274) 
0.000 
(−0.397) 
Observations 533 533 533 533 533 533 
χ2 statistics 90.098*** 81.994*** 125.372*** 127.394*** 252.133*** 256.719***
Selected 
Model 
Fixed 
Effect 
Model 
Fixed 
Effect 
Model 
Fixed 
Effect 
Model 
Fixed 
Effect 
Model 
Fixed 
Effect 
Model 
Fixed 
Effect 
Model 
Adjusted-R2 0.930 0.930 0.936 0.936 0.994 0.994 
*Significance at the 10% level; **Significance at the 5% level; ***Significance at the 1% level. 
